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A JEWISH AND (DECLINING) DEMOCRATIC STATE?  
CONSTITUTIONAL RETROGRESSION IN ISRAEL 
NADIV MORDECHAY & YANIV ROZNAI 
INTRODUCTION 
“President Trump is right.  I built a wall along Israel’s southern 
border.  It stopped all illegal immigration.  Great success.  Great 
idea.”1 
 
The rhetoric is identical.  Anyone who follows President Donald Trump 
on Twitter can easily identify the populist style.2  Sentences are short; the 
message is unequivocal.  Authority is eminent and the target audience is 
clear.  The electoral harvest is immediate even if it often leads to direct dip-
lomatic crises.  The political strategy is the same—targeting the lowest com-
monality of the part of the electorate that had, until recently, been regarded 
as excluded from decision-making focal points and institutions.  The means 
to achieve the political goals are similar, as well: distrust of the law, disre-
garding professionals, contempt for bureaucracy and existing institutions, 
and a desire to “roll back the state.”  A central, common feature is the disre-
gard of, and even offensive approach towards the media.  As Freedom 
House’s Freedom of the Press 2017 report states, “Like Trump, Israeli prime 
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 1.  Benjamin Netanyahu (@netanyahu), TWITTER (Jan. 28, 2017, 10:55 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/netanyahu/status/825371795972825089?lang=en.  2.  See Alon Harel & Noam Kolt, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Populist Politics (on 
file with authors); David Enoch, The Masses and the Elites: Political Philosophy for the Age of 
Brexit, Trump & Netanyahu (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Pa-
per No. 17-13, 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2906292; Naama Weiss 
Yaniv & Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Israel: Right-Wing Populism and Beyond, in POPULIST 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN EUROPE 207 (Toril Aalberg et al. eds., 2017) (discussing populism 
in Israel).  See generally JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016). 
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minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his spokespeople frequently insult and de-
nounce members of the domestic media, and the prime minister rarely takes 
questions from reporters.”3 
One element separates the two cases.  Contrary to President Trump, in 
office since January 20, 2017, Benjamin Netanyahu has been serving contin-
uously as Prime Minister for an unprecedented eight years in a row, thus sur-
passing the tenure of Israel’s founder, David Ben-Gurion.  And contrary to 
President Trump, whose policies are still deeply contested,4 Netanyahu has 
been perceived in Israel, at least until recently, as the lone candidate for the 
prime-ministership, and as the only leader who can deal with the complicated 
challenges Israel faces.5 
In recent years, Israel has been transformed.  If in the past its reputation 
as “the only democracy in the Middle East” was a truism taken for granted, 
nowadays it is questionable.6  Netanyahu’s era has been analyzed in a fram-
ing that recognized the political change and the power shift to new elites and 
decision-making hubs.  However, few have examined the democratic impli-
cations of his long tenure.7  It is imperative to focus the spotlight on the con-
sequences of Netanyahu’s political dominance—in recent years, hegem-
ony—and its implications for the Israeli democratic system and, most 
particularly, Israel’s fragile constitutional order. 
This Article describes and analyzes an increasing trend of contemporary 
democratic hybridization and constitutional retrogression in Israel.  We seek 
to reconstruct the Israeli case as a state of affairs where a strong leadership, 
coupled with rising political elites, are leading to a wide-ranging political risk 
                                                          
 3.  Jennifer Dunham, Press Freedom’s Dark Horizon, in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2017, 
FREEDOM HOUSE (2017), http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2017.   4.  See generally WILLIAM L. BENOIT & MARK J. GLANTZ, PERSUASIVE ATTACKS ON 
DONALD TRUMP IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY (2017).  5.  Already five years ago, in the Time cover story, Netanyahu was described as follows: “He 
has no national rival.  His approval rating, roughly 50%, is at an all-time high.  At a moment when 
incumbents around the world are being shunted aside, he is triumphant.”  Ishaan Tharoor, Cover 
Story: Why Bibi Netanyahu Is King of Israel, TIME (May 17, 2012), 
http://world.time.com/2012/05/17/cover-story-why-bibi-netanyahu-is-king-of-israel/ (quoting 
Richard Stengel, Will Israel’s Netanyahu Make Peace or War?, TIME (May 28, 2012)).  
 6.  See, e.g., Nahum Barnea, Opinion, The Future of Israeli Democracy Is in Our Hands, 
YNETNEWS (Apr. 4, 2017, 9:21 PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4943757,00.html 
(“Our government . . . takes every opportunity to remind the world that we are the only democracy 
in the Middle East. . . . The moves initiated by its members are . . . eating into the democratic rules 
of the game, violating minority rights and preventing anti-government criticism.”).  7.  Recently, there are calls in Israel to limit the Prime Minister’s term in office.  See, e.g., 
Sharon Pulwer, Israel Mulls Setting Term Limit from Prime Ministers—but Not for Netanyahu, 
HAARETZ (Jan. 22, 2017), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.766551. 
 246 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:244 
 
to the constitutional liberal-democracy,8 to an erosion of its democratic insti-
tutions, and to an incremental democratic backslide.9 
This Article contributes to the evolving recent literature in comparative 
constitutional law on the constitutional implications of democratic retrogres-
sion10 by characterizing the Israeli case as one that might be categorized as 
constitutional retrogression.  This, as we argue, carries greater normative and 
descriptive implications.  Descriptively, our analysis sheds new light on Is-
raeli constitutionalism in general and on the constitutional revolution in par-
ticular.  Instead of regarding the Israeli constitution-making as a western lib-
eral-democratic success story, we argue it is closer to that which is termed in 
the literature the “Global South.”11  Normatively, the understanding that the 
Israeli constitutional order is much more fragile than its prevailing image, 
prospective constitutional adjudication (and scholarship) should put greater 
emphasis on Israel’s “institutional constitution”—the constitutional set of 
norms that protects the democratic rules of the game, elections, separation of 
powers, representation, etc.  Our overall argument is that there is a danger 
and an ongoing, systematic deterioration of the Israeli constitutional model, 
which requires a systemic political and juristic response. 
This contribution to American and foreign scholarship is twofold.  First, 
a symposium on “the constitutional crisis of liberal democracies” is a virtu-
ous occasion to call comparative constitutional scholars’ attention to the dem-
ocratic costs of recent events in Israel, and an opportunity to urge them to 
further analyze Israel in future comparative studies of constitutional retro-
gression.  Second, at least to some extent, a comparison between the Israeli 
and the American cases is appropriate.  It seems that for the first time, the 
                                                          
 8.  On the understanding of constitutional rulemaking as a means for the management of po-
litical risks, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK (2014).  9.  The incremental aspect is imperative.  As Kim Lane Scheppele puts it, “The Frankenstate, 
too, is composed from various perfectly reasonable pieces, and its monstrous quality comes from 
the horrible way that those pieces interact when stitched together.”  Kim Lane Scheppele, Commen-
tary, The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do Not Work, 26 
GOVERNANCE 559, 560 (2013). 
 10.  See, e.g., Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. 
INT’L L. (forthcoming 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2875931; Aziz Z. Huq & Tom Ginsburg, 
How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2901776; David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 189, 211 (2013); William Partlett, Courts and Constitution-Making, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
921, 922–23 (2015); Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 
396 (2015); Ozan O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1673, 1685 (2015).    11.  See generally CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH: THE ACTIVIST TRIBUNALS 
OF INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND COLOMBIA (Daniel Bonilla Maldonado ed., 2013); COURTS AND 
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? 
(Roberto Gargarella et al. eds., 2006); TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: COMPARING THE 
APEX COURTS OF BRAZIL, INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA (Oscar Vilhena et al. eds., 2013); 
TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW IUS 
COMMUNE (Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2017). 
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young and shaky Israeli democratic tradition can teach some lessons to its 
much older and established “sister” across the Atlantic.  Within the global 
democratic recession,12 and against countries that seem to have already 
crossed the competitive authoritarian Rubicon,13 the joint visions of the two 
leaders and the strange dance they dance, between a commitment to democ-
racy and threats to the erosion of constitutional and social orders that 
strengthen it, can lead the Israeli case to be highly relevant for the under-
standing of the local “constitutional crisis” here already or soon to be.14 
Part I of this Article describes the Israeli constitutional revolution to 
demonstrate how the prevailing image of Israel’s reputation as a liberal-dem-
ocratic success story was anchored.  Part II describes and analyzes recent 
events in Israel that, in our minds, manifest the weakening of competitive 
elections, liberal rights, and adjudicative and administrative rules of law, and 
taken together, point to a process of constitutional retrogression.  Part III lays 
out the descriptive and normative implications of this retrogression.  Part IV 
concludes. 
I.  THE 1992 CONSTITUTIONAL (REVOLUTIONARY) ORDER 
Israel’s constitutional story is rather complicated as in many ways the 
constitution-making is still in process.15  Israel’s constitutional model is 
based on an incomplete constitution due to the original decision not to com-
plete the constitutional design at the time of the establishment of the state, 
but rather to leave it as an incremental enterprise in which the Knesset (the 
Israeli Parliament) would enact the constitution in stages through a series of 
                                                          
 12.  See, e.g., Amichai Magen, The Democratic Entitlement in an Era of Democratic Reces-
sion, 4 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 368 (2015).  But see Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way, The 
Myth of Democratic Recession, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 45 (2015).  For an exploration of and competing 
viewpoints on the world’s state of “democratic recession,” see DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE? (Larry 
Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 2015).  13.  See, e.g., Yusuf Sarfati & Aviad Rubin, Introduction: Israel and Turkey in Comparative 
Perspective, in THE JARRING ROAD TO DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION 1, 5 (Aviad Rubin & Yusuf Sarfati 
eds., 2016) (comparing Israel and Turkey, “[t]here is no doubt, however, that the fairness of political 
contestation has significantly eroded in Turkey in the past five years and, if we consider democracy 
and authoritarianism as a continuum, the Turkish political system has moved towards the latter”).  14.  See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV. 147, 160 
(2017) (concluding “[t]he language of constitutional rot is a better way to understand people’s re-
current use of ‘constitutional crisis’ in describing the Trump Administration.  There is currently no 
actual constitutional crisis in the United States.  But if constitutional rot continues, we are living on 
borrowed time.”); see also Michaela Hailbronner & David Landau, Introduction: Constitutional 
Courts and Populism, I-CONNECT (Apr. 22, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/04/intro-
duction-constitutional-courts-and-populism/ (“Time will tell whether, for example, the deeply in-
grained culture of U.S. constitutionalism actually serves as a form of protection against potential 
threats to courts and other institutions posed by the Trump presidency . . . .”).  15.  See generally ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING (Gideon Sapir, Daphne 
Barak-Erez & Aharon Barak eds., 2013). 
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Basic Laws.16  The Knesset, in other words, holds both legislative and con-
stituent powers.17  Since the early years of independence through the early 
1990s, the Israeli Constitution included several Basic Laws that regulate gov-
ernmental structure and institutions. Moreover, the High Court of Justice 
(“HCJ”) has had a respectable tradition of judicial protection over unwritten 
common law rights and freedoms.18 
In 1992, the Knesset enacted two Basic Laws on fundamental rights: 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, and Basic Law: Freedom of Occu-
pation, that together constitute a partially entrenched bill of rights.19  Three 
years later, the United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village20 case 
asserted the authority of judicial review, comparable to the “Marbury” 
model.21  Therefore, the Israeli constitutional story is rather unique as it ap-
plies American-style judicial review of primary legislation, yet its constitu-
tional laws are enacted through ordinary legislation procedures, in the Brit-
ish-style.22 
Israel is also particularly unique due to the inverse ratio between the thin 
written Constitution and the constitutional role of its court.  The HCJ hears 
petitions about Knesset legislation and administrative decisions as the first 
instance of review, and its constitutional review model is very close to an 
“abstract” review.  The HCJ takes a very broad interpretation of justiciability 
                                                          
 16.  See HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 51–52 
(2011); Adam Shinar, Accidental Constitutionalism: The Political Foundations and Implications of 
Constitution-Making in Israel, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 207, 
207 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013). 
 17.  See Suzie Navot, Israel, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE 191–95 (Dawn Oliver & Carlo 
Fusaro eds., 2011).  18.  Amos Shapira, Judicial Review Without a Constitution: The Israeli Paradox, 56 TEMP. 
L.Q. 405, 421–23 (1983). 
 19.  See Aharon Barak, A Constitutional Revolution: Israel’s Basic Laws, 4 CONST. F. 83, 83 
(1993); David Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini-Revolution in Israeli Con-
stitutional Law?, 26 ISR. L. REV. 238, 238 (1992); Gideon Sapir, Constitutional Revolutions: Israel 
as a Case-Study, 5 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 355, 362 (2009); SUZIE NAVOT, Mizrahi Bank Case (Isr), 
in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, http://oxcon.ou-
plaw.com/view/10.1093/law-mpeccol/law-mpeccol-
e597?rskey=9d8OP8andresult=32andprd=MPECCOL  
 20.  CA 6821/93 49(4) PD 221 (1995) (Isr.). 
 21.  Id.; see Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli 
Challenge in American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309, 326–27 (1995); Yoram 
Rabin & Arnon Gutfeld, Marbury v. Madison and Its Impact on Israeli Constitutional Law, 15 U. 
MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 303 (2007). 
 22.  Rivka Weill, Hybrid Constitutionalism: The Israeli Case for Judicial Review and Why We 
Should Care, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 349, 356 (2012). 
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as it adjudicates issues often considered political; it also maintains broad in-
dividual standing in administrative and constitutional petitions (also from 
protected populations in the occupied territories).23 
The Israeli revolutionary model was perceived worldwide as a success 
story.  The well-known constitutional status of the new Basic Laws on human 
rights, coupled with the bold reputation of the HCJ under the leadership of 
Justice Aharon Barak, led to the perception of the Israeli constitutional pro-
ject as a democratic, liberal-Western success story.24 
In contrast to the outstanding reputation of the constitutional revolution, 
the Israeli constitutional project has been controversial in the domestic arena 
since its inception.25  Naturally, the judicial dominance of the constitutional 
project raised the question of its democratic legitimacy.  Wojciech Sadurski 
noted that Israel is a distinctive case in this regard because there is a big dif-
ference between a situation where constitutional judicial review was created 
through a contractual constitution, or with a significant constitution-making 
stage preceding it, and a situation (as in the history of the United States and 
especially as in Israel) where the court has given itself constitutional author-
ity in conflict with the parliament or the public.  The latter situation leads to 
the existence of judicial review in a strong, political and social contestation.  
Accordingly, the role of the constitutional court is always being exercised “in 
the shadow of this ‘original sin.’”26 
Indeed, from the early “constitutional spring”27 of the mid-1990s, the 
existence and scope of constitutional judicial review in Israel has been 
harshly contested.28  What began, at the end of the 1990s, as a public and 
                                                          
 23.  See Eli Salzberger, Judicial Activism in Israel, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMMON LAW 
SUPREME COURTS 217, 240–43 (Brice Dickson ed., 2007); Daphne Barak-Erez, Judicial Review of 
Politics: The Israeli Case, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 611, 611 (2002); Meir Shamgar, The Observance of 
International Law in the Administered Territories, in 1 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 262 
(Yoram Dinstein ed., 1971).   24.  Cf. NUNO GAROUPA & TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REPUTATION: A COMPARATIVE 
THEORY 171 (2015) (mentioning that the judicial opinions of former Israeli Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Aharon Barak were “frequently analyzed and borrowed abroad” (citing ANNE-MARIE 
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–82 (2004)). 
 25.  See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies, 33 ISR. L. REV. 216, 
216 (1999) (“The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and 
respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources.”).   26.  Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutional Courts in Transition Processes: Legitimacy and De-
mocratization 4 (Sydney Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 11/53, 2011).  27.  We use the term “constitutional spring” as a metaphor to denote a “time of renewal” or 
blooming of the constitutional order.  See Ludmila Torlakova, Metaphors of the Arab Spring: Fig-
urative Construals of the Uprisings and Revolutions, 14 J. ARABIC & ISLAMIC STUD. 1, 6 (2014) 
(“[T]he notion of ‘spring’ is a universal symbol standing for a fresh beginning, new growth, and 
new life.”).   28.  See, e.g., Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, After the Revolution, 34 ISR. L. REV. 139, 154 (2000); 
Amnon Reichman, Judicial Constitution Making in a Divided Society: The Israeli Case, in 
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political criticism of the “Constitutional Revolution,” among narrow circles 
in the Israeli society and politics, has become a widespread and consolidated 
political criticism in the early 2000s,29 and a very powerful political front in 
the last half-decade, whose members are senior political figures in the Exec-
utive and the Knesset.  Yoav Dotan writes: 
 The wave of opposition to the court’s activist policies intensified 
throughout the 2000s and reached its pick [sic] (at least for now) 
toward the end of that decade.  Open attacks on the court’s activism 
became commonplace within the Israeli media by politicians, bu-
reaucrats, top columnists, and even law professors.  This wave of 
criticism has been accompanied by a sharp decrease in public trust 
in the court.30 
In addition, it is important to stress the fact that the constitutional project 
was characterized, at least by its opponents, as an elite’s project that included 
the creation of a constitution without the people.  Whether it was the “former 
hegemonic”31 elite or the new judicial elite, the legend of a constitution that 
was enacted without the people hovered in the upbringing of the 1992 con-
stitutional order.  It presented a narrative of a judicial, leftist elite promoting 
universal values. 
However, despite the public and political criticism and the increase in 
the political threats regarding its scope,32 judicial review—which was con-
sidered far-reaching in comparative terms even in the 1990s33—has not 
weakened.34  Throughout the first two decades of the constitutional revolu-
tion, the institutional equilibrium remained stable, and those who objected to 
judicial review did not lead a significant change that would weaken the 
                                                          
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 233, 245–58 (Diana Ka-
piszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2013).    29.  RUTH GAVISON ET AL., JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: FOR AND AGAINST, THE ROLE OF THE HIGH 
COURT OF JUSTICE IN ISRAELI SOCIETY (2000) (as interpreted by the authors).  30.  YOAV DOTAN, LAWYERING FOR THE RULE OF LAW: GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE 
RISE OF JUDICIAL POWER IN ISRAEL 49 (2014) (footnote omitted) (citing M. MAUTNER, LAW AND 
CULTURE IN ISRAEL AT THE THRESHHOLD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2008)).  31.  MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 110 (2011); see also RAN 
HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 214 (2004).   32.  GAROUPA & GINSBURG, supra note 24, at 117 (“Judicial activism by the Supreme Court 
under retired president Aharon Barak . . . has prompted fierce debate over whether the system needs 
revision. . . .  Many believe that the Israeli Supreme Court has been too activist, and we have begun 
to observe renewed calls for structural reforms to rein in the judiciary.” (footnotes omitted)).  33.  See MAUTNER, supra note 31, at 160.  34.  Although, as we later describe, the HCJ has developed various judicial institutional tools 
which replace invalidation of unconstitutional legislation (such as issuing a nullification notice), 
that express, to our mind, judicial restraint.  
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court’s authority or change the institutional balances created by the constitu-
tional revolution. 
In fact, despite the harsh criticism of its opponents, the constitutional 
revolution was accepted by many Israeli political actors in the decades fol-
lowing the Mizrahi judgment.  The more intensive involvement of legal gate-
keepers in political decisionmaking processes and the judicial defense of 
rights and freedoms were established in Israel through tacit political consent.  
For various reasons, the Basic Laws on Human Rights have not been re-
pealed,35 and the Knesset, in fact, accepted the idea that it has constitutional 
limits and considers these limits during the legislative process.36  Even among 
right-wing governments (such as Netanyahu’s first term in 1996) there was a 
certain commitment to the democratic-liberal order of judicial review and the 
strong institutions accompanying it.  Even though many of the political right 
wing identified with the strong opposition to the constitutional revolution, 
they also understood its legal, political, and social advantages. 
However, the last few years’ rise of new elites signifies the attack on 
those symbolic values of the constitutional revolution—a counter-revolution 
to the constitutional revolution.37  We argue that, considering the changing 
landscape of Israeli constitutionalism in recent years and especially since 
2015, the comprehension of the Israeli constitutional system should be revis-
ited.  Our proposed depiction of Israeli constitutionalism may even lead to 
rethinking the way, in previous decades, Israeli constitutionalism was under-
stood. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL RETROGRESSION 
“Israeli democracy is fragile because it has no constitution, no 
foundation, no checks and balances and politicians can and do just 
completely change the rules of the game when they want . . . if 
there is power, they use it . . . .”38 
The preservation of Netanyahu’s rule over an exceptional period in Is-
raeli politics and the growing influence of the deep commitment to an alter-
native and more nationalist vision of the state in the last few years has led to 
                                                          
 35.  Ori Aronson, Why Hasn’t the Knesset Repealed Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty? 
On the Status Quo as Counter Majoritarian Difficulty, 37 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 509 (2016) (as 
interpreted by the authors).  36.  Yaniv Roznai, The Basic Laws on Human Rights and the Legislative Process in the Knes-
set—You’ve Got to Practice What You Preach, 14 IDC L. REV.—LAW & THE MAN: FESTSCHRIFT 
FOR AMNON RUBINSTEIN 199 (2012).  37.  Doron Navot & Yoav Peled, Towards a Constitutional Counter-Revolution in Israel?, 16 
CONSTELLATIONS 429, 429 (2009).  
 38.  Yonah Jeremy Bob, Israel’s Fragile Democracy Would End If Not for Supreme Court, 
JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.jpost.com/printarticle.aspx?id=488274 (quoting for-
mer Supreme Court Justice Dalia Dorner’s comments to the Jerusalem Post).  
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a significant erosion in the constitutional order of 1992, and can lead to a 
severe deterioration in the rule of law and separation of powers.  This political 
dynamic, which at first did not lead to a significant constitutional change, is 
currently evolving into an increase in electoral demand for populist politics 
and into a straightforward political confrontation with the formal symbols of 
the 1992 constitutional revolution, which is perceived in Israel as an elite’s 
project imposed on the people and not as a unifying project.39  To this, one 
should add the fact that the need to legitimize Israel’s rule over the occupied 
territories and the growing international criticism of the Israeli use of force 
have made the constitutional enterprise in Israel somewhat indispensable40—
even in the new reality of political convergence to a right-wing illiberal 
model—and for those reasons, the venture has become much more fragile, 
even though it has not completely eroded. 
The past few years symbolize a sharp political and social turning point.  
The strategic strengthening of the right wing in Israel and the relative decline 
of the political left; the inability to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the 
increase in economic inequality considering the previous decade’s govern-
ment’s liberalization policies; and, above all, the consolidation of political 
power around Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership created a new constitutional 
climate.41  The political dominance of the right has become a much stronger, 
discursive fact with a greater commitment to the values of nationalism and 
the territorial integrity of the country, alongside the rise of the electoral power 
of religious Zionism as a social and political group.42  This new political re-
ality led to a renewed political focus on traditional right-wing values in Israel, 
leaving the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict and maintaining the mili-
tary control over the occupied territories on one hand and a neo-liberal ideo-
logical commitment on the other hand.  These, in turn, led to an increase in 
international pressure on the State, which is reflected in the intensification of 
international involvement in the conflict and its legalization, as well as inter-
nal pressure for socio-economic reform, which has not received a political 
response and became more acute in the social protest of the summer of 
2011.43  These are the environments that underlie the rise of populist politics 
                                                          
 39.  See Yaniv Roznai, Internally Imposed Constitutions, in IMPOSED CONSTITUTIONALISM 
(Xenophon Contiades et al. eds., forthcoming 2018) (on file with authors).  40.  Nadiv Mordechay, Loosening the Purse by Shielding the Sword: Linking the Judicializa-
tion of War and That of Social Justice in Israel (Apr. 28, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with authors).    41.  Aluf Benn, The End of the Old Israel: How Netanyahu Has Transformed the Nation, 
FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 2016, at 16, 16.   42.  See AMI PEDAHZUR, THE TRIUMPH OF ISRAEL’S RADICAL RIGHT 210 (2012).   43.  On the 2011 social protest in Israel, see, for example, Eitan Y. Alimi, ‘Occupy Israel’: A 
Tale of Startling Success and Hopeful Failure, 11 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 402 (2012).  
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that have focused, over the past two years, on a direct attack on the constitu-
tional order. 
Constitutional retrogression is defined by Huq and Ginsburg as an “in-
cremental (but ultimately substantial) decay in three basic predicates of de-
mocracy—competitive elections, liberal rights to speech and association, and 
the adjudicative and administrative rule of law necessary for democratic 
choice to thrive.”44  All three bases are under constant threats.  Although their 
decline is incremental—by analyzing the state of affairs in an aggregated 
manner—we ultimately claim that recent developments put Israel on a dan-
gerous route to a constitutional retrogression.45  We distinguish between two 
types of anti-constitutional performances: direct and second-order instances 
of anti-constitutionalism. 
A.  Direct Anti-Constitutionalism 
Direct anti-constitutionalism is defined as direct, abusive political 
clashes with existing Israeli constitutional structures, with the declared pur-
pose of changing or severely eroding the existing constitutional order.  A 
notable example is the government’s recurring attempts to enact “Basic Law: 
Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People,” which would change the 
fundamental character of the Israeli State, bringing it closer to a model of a 
“nation-state of the Jewish people,”46 with an explicit intention to change the 
constitutional balance between the basic values of the states as “Jewish and 
democratic” so that, in case of a conflict, the former would prevail over the 
latter.47  While there have been several repeated attempts to enact such a 
Basic Law in years past, it appears that the bill has recently received strong 
support from Prime Minister Netanyahu, who called for “all Zionist parties” 
                                                          
 44.  Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 610.  45.  In this short Article, we cannot thoroughly and rigorously analyze all these developments; 
each requires a deep analysis, but we briefly mention the main developments in order to give a 
certain sense to the recent trends.  46.  Joel Greenberg, Israel Takes First Step Towards ‘Jewish Nation-State’ Law, FIN. TIMES 
(May 10, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/c0d7b0d2-35b6-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e (quoting 
Prime Minister Netanyahu). 
 47.  See, e.g., Amir Fuchs & Mordechai Kremnitzer, Opinion, Basic Law: Israel as the Nation 
State of the Jewish People—A Danger to the Zionist Enterprise, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (May 12, 
2014), http://en.idi.org.il/articles/6443 (“Let us not be naïve.  This proposal [to enact Basic Law: 
Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People] is not intended to reflect the status quo but to alter 
it in a fundamental way—to puff up the state’s Jewish-national character and diminish and curtail 
its democratic character.”); Aeyal Gross, Opinion, Israel’s Nation-State Bill Is Undemocratic, 
HAARETZ (May 11, 2017, 5:55 PM), http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.788553 (argu-
ing, “this bill seeks to undermine the principle that stands at the foundation of democracy: the prin-
ciple of equal citizenship”).  
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to support it and for acceleration of the legislative process.48  At present, the 
proposal is being discussed by a special Knesset committee and politically 
promoted by most of the coalition parties.  Even if the bill does not pass in 
its current form, the constitutional debate that develops around it reflects an 
electoral, social, political, and national desire to redefine the equilibrium be-
tween democratic principles and national principles. 
The ever-increasing threats to the judiciary are another source of con-
cern.  These include legislative proposals to limit the court’s competence to 
review legislation and invalidate unconstitutional laws,49 to insert an override 
clause into Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom,50 to limit standing for 
petitioning the HCJ,51 to change the manner of voting in the judicial election 
committee,52 or to change the seniority principle, according to which the most 
veteran Supreme Court justice takes over when the Court’s president retires.53  
In addition to these legislative proposals, politicians from the coalition have 
even spoken out publicly against the Court.54  In a “critical speech given at 
the annual conference of the Israeli Bar” in 2016, the Minister of Justice her-
self, Ayelet Shaked, warned the HCJ against intervention in matters beyond 
its jurisdiction and stated that, in the future, judicial appointments will be 
based on their approach toward judicial activism.55  In another speech, Min-
ister Shaked criticized the HCJ for prioritizing individual rights over Zionist 
                                                          
 48.  Lahav Harkov, Netanyahu Fast-Tracks Jewish Nation-State Bill, JERUSALEM POST (May 
14, 2017, 3:19 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Netanyahu-fast-
tracks-Jewish-nation-state-bill-490690 (quoting Prime Minister Netanyahu’s remarks).  49.  See, e.g., Uzi Baruch, Proposed Law Aims to Give Knesset Full Authority, ARUTZ SHEVA 
(Feb. 11, 2017), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/224789; Editorial, Israel’s 
Anti-Constitutional Revolution, HAARETZ (July 9, 2017, 12:11 AM), 
https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/editorial/1.800257; Tova Tzimuki & Moran Azulay, Bennett, 
Shaked Move to Bypass High Court Rulings, YNETNEWS (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.ynet-
news.com/articles/0,7340,L-5017044,00.html.  50.  See, e.g., Amir Fuchs, Opinion, Overriding the Supreme Court: A Breach in the Wall of 
Democracy, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (Oct. 28, 2014), https://en.idi.org.il/articles/6242.  51.  Moran Azulay, Bill to Limit Standing for Petitioning High Court of Justice, YNETNEWS 
(May 12, 2017), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4961151,00.html.  52.  Marissa Newman, Chief Justice Slams Minister over Bid to Change Selection Process for 
Judges, TIMES OF ISR. (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.timesofisrael.com/justices-snub-minister-over-
bid-to-limit-their-power-to-select-judges/.  53.  See Editorial, Respect the Seniority Principle at the Supreme Court, HAARETZ (June 1, 
2017, 2:14 AM), https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/editorial/1.793012.  54.  See, e.g., Gideon Allon & Yori Yalon, Minister Blasts Supreme Court’s Legislative Med-
dling, ISR. HAYOM (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_arti-
cle.php?id=40369 (quoting the tourism minister, “I believe the time has come for the Knesset to 
speak its piece in a sharp and clear manner. . . .  [I]t is fitting for the Knesset to stand and say, as 
clearly as possible: Remove your hand from the legislation.  In a democratic state, the legislation is 
determined in parliament by representatives of the people, and not by a court whose composition 
does not reflect the composition of Israeli society in its entirety.”).  55.  Sarfati & Rubin, supra note 13, at 6.  
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and Jewish considerations: “Zionism should not continue, and I say here, it 
will not continue to bow down to the system of individual rights interpreted 
in a universal way that divorces them from the history of the Knesset and the 
history of legislation that we all know.”56 As The Economist described not 
long ago: 
[The ruling party] Likud is run by a leader who has sworn to break 
the power of the “old elites” and whose colleagues see the Supreme 
Court judges as remnants of a privileged left-wing establishment 
which disregards Jewish values in favour of secular and universal 
principles.  The struggle to limit the powers of the Supreme Court 
is part of a broader contest over the nature of Israel—pitting reli-
gious and nationalist activists against advocates of a more liberal 
and secular-minded country.57 
The strength of the Supreme Court, nowadays under the largest political 
attack in its history, has not broken yet.  One cannot overstate the importance 
of the Israeli Judiciary.  There is hardly any public affair which does not come 
before the Court’s scrutiny, and the Court actively adjudicates on political, 
military, and religious issues no matter how contentious.  It seems that it still 
retains a model of strong judicial review and judicial independence, despite 
serious concerns for curtailing the powers of the judiciary by appointing 
judges considered to be relatively conservative.58  In 2016 alone,59  the HCJ 
demonstrated judicial activism, for example, when nullifying a stability 
                                                          
 56.  Revital Hovel, Justice Minister Slams Israel’s Top Court, Says It Disregards Zionism and 
Upholding Jewish Majority, HAARETZ (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/1.809617.  57.  Editorial, Netanyahu v. The Supreme Court, ECONOMIST (May 2, 2015), http://www.econ-
omist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21650159-prime-minister-takes-judiciary-netanyahu-v-su-
preme-court.  58.  On February 22, 2017, four new Israeli Supreme Court Justices were appointed to office.  
See Uzi Baruch, Four New Judges Appointed to Supreme Court, ARUTZ SHEVA (Feb. 22, 2017), 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/225508.  These appointments were viewed 
by some as a “victory” for the right political wing.  See Peter Beaumont, Israel’s Rightwing Justice 
Minister Hails Supreme Court Appointments, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2017/feb/23/israel-appoints-three-conservative-judges-to-supreme-court; Shmuel 
Rosner, Opinion, How Israel Got Its Supreme Court Right, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/opinion/how-israel-got-its-supreme-court-
right.html?mcubz=0.   59.  See Uzi Vogelman et al., Developments in Israeli Constitutional Law: The Year 2016 in 
Review, in THE I·CONNECT-CLOUGH CENTER 2016 GLOBAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(Richard Albert et al. eds., 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3014378; Uzi Vogelman, et al., Devel-
opments in Israeli Constitutional Law: The Year 2016 in Review, I-CONNECT (Oct. 4, 2017), 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/10/developments-in-israeli-constitutional-law-the-year-2016-
in-review/. 
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clause in a governmental “Gas Outline”60; recognizing conversions to Juda-
ism by private ultra-Orthodox rabbinical courts for the Law of Return;61 and 
giving a “validity notice” to the prime minister for holding several cabinet 
positions.62  On the other hand, the court also demonstrated restraint—for 
example, it allowed the re-appointment of Aryeh Deri as the Minister of In-
terior,63 even though he had committed bribery, breach of trust, and other 
criminal offenses during his tenure as Minister of Interior in the late 1980s; 
permitted the policy of home demolitions;64 and approved a law which re-
duces and limits the salaries of high officials in financial companies.65 
Furthermore, in recent years—and especially in the second and third 
decades following the constitutional revolution—the HCJ has developed ju-
dicial tools which allow it to act cautiously and with restraint, as part of its 
dialogue with the Knesset.66  For example, it developed the remedy of sus-
pension of declaration of invalidation,67 increased its use of the “ripeness 
doctrine,”68 and developed—and has been increasingly using in politically 
sensitive decisions—the remedy of “notice of validity.”69 
Nonetheless, the impact of the HCJ on Israeli constitutional law, as well 
as on society remains crucial.70  Moreover, the HCJ has recently demon-
strated signs of “dynamic” jurisprudence,71 in some confrontations with the 
                                                          
 60.  HCJ 4374/15 Movement for Quality of Government v. Prime Minister of Israel (Mar. 27, 
2016) (Isr.).  61.  HCJ 7625/06 Ragachuva v. The Ministry of Interior (Mar. 31, 2016). 
 62.  HCJ 3132/15 Yesh Atid v. Prime Minister of Israel (Apr. 13, 2016) (Isr.).  63.  HCJ 232/16 Movement for Quality of Government v. Prime Minister of Israel (May 8, 
2016) (Isr.).   64.  See e.g., HCJ 1125/16 Meri v. Military Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank (Mar. 
31, 2016) (Isr.); Masudi et al. v. Military Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank (Mar. 23, 
2016) (Isr.).   65.  HCJ 4406/16 Association of Banks in Israel v. Knesset (Sept. 29, 2016) (Isr.).   66.  Suzie Navot, The Constitutional Dialogue: A Debate Through Institutional Mechanisms, 
MISHPATIM ONLINE (forthcoming) (on file with authors).   67.  See, e.g., Yigal Mersel, Suspending the Declaration of Invalidity, 9 MISHPAT 
U’MIMSHAL—LAW AND GOVERNMENT 39 (2005) (Heb).  See generally Anthony Niblett, Delaying 
Declaration of Constitutional Invalidity, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 299 (Frank Fagan & Saul 
Levmore eds., 2017).   68.  Ariel L. Bendor, The Israeli Judiciary-Centered Constitutionalism (on file with authors).   69.  On validity notice, see Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Time and Judicial Review: Tempering the 
Temporal Effects of Judicial Review, in THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN TIME 207 (Patricia 
Popelier et al. eds. 2014); Rosalind Dixon & Samuel Issacharoff, Living to Fight Another Day: 
Judicial Deferral in Defense of Democracy, WIS. L. REV. 683 (2016).  70.  Ruth Gavison, Legislatures and the Quest for a Constitution: The Case of Israel, 11 REV. 
CONST. STUD. 345, 346 (2006) (“[T]he Israeli legislature has not taken—for a variety of reasons—
a clear and firm position on constitutional issues, letting the court be the driving agent of the pro-
cess.”).   71.  Cf. David Landau, A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1501, 1503 (2014) 
(explaining that much of the judicial effort in the contexts of fragile democracies of the Global 
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Israeli executive branch and some progressive approaches in the institutional 
sphere.72  A notable example is a recent judgment from August 2017, in 
which the HCJ struck down a law taxing owners of three or more homes on 
legislative-procedural grounds.  This was the first time that Knesset’s legis-
lation was invalidated on legislative-procedural grounds.  In a majority opin-
ion, written by Justice Noam Sohlberg, the HCJ held that the law passed in a 
rushed process, close to midnight, with Knesset Members from both the co-
alition and opposition claiming they did not have time to properly examine 
the bill.  In these circumstances, there was a flaw in the very root of the leg-
islative process.  The court thus returned the proposed law to the Knesset 
Finance Committee to be prepared anew for second and third readings.73  
With this decision, the HCJ puts itself in the role of protector of the demo-
cratic process, guardian of the Knesset, and ensures that it acts with due pro-
cess and is not overrun by the government.  According to the Court’s con-
ception, by this interference with the legislative process, the HCJ 
vindicates—not violates—separation of powers. 
This dynamic jurisprudence, however, has not effectively internalized 
the new reality of dominant political leadership and its potential democratic 
consequences, because political consolidation is a central feature of recent 
years.  Governmental powers and government departments are concentrated 
in the hands of Prime Minister Netanyahu, reducing the weight of his coali-
tion partners.  At a certain point, Prime Minister Netanyahu has simultane-
                                                          
South is oriented to improve the quality of the political-democratic systems, which are regarded as 
deficient).   72.  See, e.g., Susan Hattis Rolef, Opinion, Think About It: The High Court of Justice and Gov-
ernment-Knesset Relations, JERUSALEM POST (Sept. 10, 2017), http://www.jpost.com/Opin-
ion/Think-about-it-The-High-Court-of-Justice-and-government-Knesset-relations-504733 
(“Within a single month (August 6 to September 6 [2017]) the High Court of Justice issued three 
important rulings connected with the Knesset’s oversight function vis-à-vis the government, which 
has weakened significantly in the past decade.  It should be noted that in parliamentary democracies 
the oversight function is deficient by definition, since the system is based on the government com-
manding a majority in the parliament, so that with the help of coalition discipline it is almost always 
able to get its way.  In Israel, coalition discipline is used in the current government in an increasingly 
cynical manner, as coalition chairman MK David Bitan (Likud) uses influence (by means of the 
allocation of personal coalition funds to individual MKs) and threats against members of his own 
party (‘if you fail to “toe the line” you will pay a price in the next primaries’) to secure government 
control.  Under the circumstances it is not surprising that MKs and parliamentary groups from the 
opposition, and outside bodies concerned about malfunctions in the government system, frequently 
resort to petitions to the High Court.  The three court rulings concern the scandalous manner in 
which the government gets certain sections of the notorious Economic Arrangements Law (EAL) 
through, gets approval of budgetary transfers through the Knesset Finance Committee after the 
budget has been passed, and gets its biennial (two-year) budgets approved.”).  73.  HCJ 10042/16 Kventinsky v. Knesset (Aug. 6, 2017) (Isr.).  See Zvi Zrahiya, In Blow to 
Finance Minister, Israel’s High Court Quashes Tax on Owners of Three Homes, HAARETZ (Aug. 
6, 2017), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/1.805515. 
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ously been Israel’s Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Communications Min-
ister, Economy Minister, and Regional Co-operation Minister.  While the 
HCJ opined that the Prime Minister’s holding these cabinet positions was not 
conducive to democracy, it was technically legal.74 
Coupled with this concentration of power is the weakening of opposi-
tion powers.  An example is state budget reform that is controlled substan-
tially by the executive.  According to the established constitutional principle, 
the government must ordinarily submit an annual budget for the approval of 
the Knesset. 75 This is a central mechanism for the Knesset to supervise the 
government.  As of 2009, however, a temporary constitutional amendment 
(which is continually prolonged) established a biennial budget, thereby cir-
cumventing the annual budget principle.76  Whereas this was meant to be a 
one-time amendment due to the global economic crisis, it has since been pro-
longed to the years 2011–2012, 2013–2014, 2015–2016 and, most recently 
2017–2018.77  This amendment further limits the oversight capacity of the 
Parliament, which is already limited in light of the constructive vote of no 
                                                          
 74. However, subject to Deputy President Rubinstein’s opinion (Justices Hendel and Meltzer, 
in their alternate opinion, concurring), the decision was served a “validity notice,” whereby if at the 
end of an eight-month period the situation remained as it was, the case could be appealed again.  See 
HCJ 3132/15, supra note 62; see also Itamar Eichner, High Court’s Deadline to Netanyahu over 
Multiple Ministries Approaching, YNETNEWS (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.ynetnews.com/arti-
cles/0,7340,L-4874005,00.html.  75.  Basic Law: The State Economy, Sec. 3(a)(2), § 5735-1975, SH No. 777 p. 206 (Isr.) (“The 
Budget shall be for one year and shall set out the expected and planned expenditure of the Govern-
ment”); see also id. Sec. 3(b)(1) (“The Government shall lay the Budget Bill on the table of the 
Knesset at the time prescribed by the Knesset or by a committee of the Knesset empowered by it in 
that behalf.”).   76.  BASIC LAW: THE STATE BUDGET FOR THE YEARS 2009 AND 2010 (special provisions, tem-
porary order), Hebrew version, http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2196/2196.pdf.  77.  See the recent BASIC LAW: THE STATE BUDGET FOR THE YEARS 2017 AND 2018 (special 
provisions, temporary provision), http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawTheBiennial-
Budget.pdf.  
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confidence which exists from 2014.78  Indeed, temporary or ad hoc constitu-
tional amendments have been recently used to upset the balance of power in 
the country in favor of the incumbent government.79 
In response to a challenge concerning the biennial budget for the years 
2011–2012, the HCJ ruled that while the use of temporary ordinances to es-
tablish the biennial budget is indeed problematic, it would not intervene, be-
cause the government was justified in experimenting with the unconventional 
biennial budget before deciding whether to adopt it as a permanent arrange-
ment.  While the court reasoned that biennial budgets do not constitute a se-
rious danger to democracy, it did harshly criticize the use of temporary Basic 
Laws, declaring that such instruments detract from the status of the Basic 
Laws and should accordingly be used sparingly.80  In a more recent case, an 
expanded seven-judge panel of the HCJ faced yet another challenge to the 
biennial budget, in light of the fact that since the first biennial budget was 
                                                          
 78.  “A constructive vote of no-confidence severely limits the legislature’s ability to bring 
down the government since it requires two elements that do not exist in a regular vote of no-confi-
dence: the support of an absolute majority of MPs and an agreement on a candidate to lead an 
alternative government. . . .  Until 2001, Israel had a regular vote of no-confidence, which was based 
on the Basic Law: The Government enacted in 1968. . . . In 2001, Israel thus adopted a quasi-con-
structive vote of no-confidence.  The new Basic Law of 2001 established the requirement of an 
absolute majority in a vote of no-confidence and added a second criterion—the need to agree on an 
alternative candidate who would be entrusted with the task of forming a new government.  On March 
11, 2014, the Knesset amended the Basic Law: The Government, adopting Article 28B which states: 
“An expression of no confidence in the Government will be by a Knesset decision, adopted by the 
majority the members, to express confidence in an alternative Government that has announced its 
policy platform, its makeup and distribution of roles among the Ministers . . . .”  In other words, it 
adopted a complete constructive vote of no-confidence.  See Reuven Y. Hazan, Analysis: Israel’s 
New Constructive Vote of No-Confidence, Knesset (Mar. 18, 2014), https://knesset.gov.il/spokes-
man/eng/PR_eng.asp?PRID=11200.  79.  See Yaniv Roznai, Sofia Ranchordás, Constitutional Sunsets and Experimental Legisla-
tion: A Comparative Perspective, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 790, 792 (2016) (book review); see also Susan 
Hattis Rolef, Opinion, Think About It: The Use of Temporary Orders to Amend Basic Laws, 
JERUSALEM POST (July 31, 2016), http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Think-About-It-The-use-of-tem-
porary-orders-to-amend-basic-laws-462887 (“[T]he greater problem is the continuous, cynical use 
made of temporary orders to amend or pass basic laws.  All the constitutional lawyers I know agree 
that the use of temporary orders in this way turns the Basic Laws—the closest thing we have to a 
constitution—into a dishrag used by the government to clean up the messes it gets itself into, and is 
problematic and unconstitutional.”).  According to one constitutional amendment, a minister who 
also serves as an MK can resign from his position at the Knesset and allow the next candidate in his 
party to take his place until his ministerial capacity terminates.  Another temporary provision to 
Basic Law: The Government, enacted only a year before, removed the limitation on the number of 
ministers.  Both constitutional amendments apply only to the current 20th Knesset Biannual.  Taken 
together with the budgeting temporary basic law, this means that between May 13, 2015 and July 
30, 2015, the Knesset enacted three temporary Basic Laws which apply temporarily only during the 
term of the twentieth Knesset.  On the increasing tendency of the Israeli legislature to use temporary 
legislation, see Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Temporary Legislation, Better Regulation and Experimentalist 
Governance: An Empirical Study, in REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE (David Levi-Faur et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2017), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12148/full.   80.  HCJ 4908/10 Bar-on, MK v. Knesset 64(3) PD 275 (2011). 
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submitted by the government in 2009, it was since prolonged by means of 
temporary ordinances. Justice Elyakim Rubenstein, writing the majority 
opinion, opened the judgment with the following statement: 
[T]he case before us raises two worrying trends within Israeli par-
liamentary democracy, which are intertwined: one, the decreasing 
importance of the Knesset as a body responsible for supervising 
the government actions.  The second, the undermining of the basic 
laws status, constitutional texts, which finds its expression both in 
various temporary orders which seek to temporary amend the basic 
laws and without a due public debate, as if it was a regular law 
rather than a constitutional document, and—on a broader con-
text—by not completing the constitution-making process of the 
state constitution in accordance with the Harrari decision of 1950.81 
Justice Rubinstein accepted the petition’s claim that the Knesset abused 
its constituent authority in approving the amendment, holding that the Knes-
set had undermined its responsibility to supervise government activities and 
the authority of the Basic Law by repeatedly “temporarily” amending it.82  
Notwithstanding the discontent, Justice Rubinstein dispensed with the man-
ner by which the government circumvents Knesset oversight, and the holding 
that there was no more justification to use temporary ordinances for the bi-
ennial budget, the HCJ refrained from invalidating the Basic Law but rather 
issued a nullification notice—a warning that would not allow temporary 
amendments to the Basic Law for budget that extends beyond a single year.83  
In light of the challenges posed by the current period, this process, of expand-
ing the power of the executive in the budget sphere and a gradual judicial 
intervention to prevent this aggrandizement, well reflects the rise of the struc-
tural constitution in the making. 
Finally, there are increasing attempts to change the legal status of the 
occupied territories through domestic legislation, with aims to change the 
                                                          
 81.  HCJ 8260/16 Ramat Gan Academic Center of Law and Business v. Knesset (Sept. 6, 2017) 
(Isr.) (as translated by the authors).  See generally Efrat Neuman, Israel’s High Court Serves Notice: 
No More Two-Year Budgets, HAARETZ (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/busi-
ness/1.811011; Rolef, supra note 72.  82.  HCJ 8260/16 Ramat Gan Academic Center of Law and Business v. Knesset (2017) (Isr.), 
para. 63.   83.  Id.  While this seems to be another institutional mechanism for self-restraint, this judgment 
is rather an expression of judicial activism as the HCJ declares that the Knesset holds limited con-
stituent power and that it has the authority to review constitutional amendments to the basic laws. 
On this thorny issue, see generally YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT: THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT POWERS (2017).  
 2017] A JEWISH AND (DECLINING) DEMOCRATIC STATE? 261 
 
customary status of the occupied territories and to unilaterally annex parts of 
them into Israel.84 
These “direct anti-constitutionalism” changes or threats relate to the 
basic democratic structure.  Additionally, as of 2011, Netanyahu’s various 
coalitions adopted a series of laws designed to limit the ability of the opposi-
tion to resist constitutional reforms, out of aspiration to entrench some illib-
eral administrative regimes in the political and civil arena.  Among these are: 
legislation raising the electoral threshold required for an election to the Knes-
set;85 legislation that allows for the dismissal of Knesset Members (“MKs”) 
who support the struggle of a terrorist organization, which de facto weakens 
Arab Knesset members;86 an amendment to Section 7(a) of Basic Law: The 
Knesset, which extends the standards for banning candidates for election, by 
clarifying that these include not only actions but also speeches;87 the “Boycott 
Law,” which prohibits individuals and organizations from boycotting Israel 
and imposes economic sanctions on citizens and organizations engaging in 
such activities, thereby limiting the freedom of expression;88 a law which de-
nies state funding to institutions that view the establishment of the State of 
Israel as a tragedy (“Nakba Law”);89 legislation imposing various disclosure 
obligations on civil-society organizations funded by foreign countries;90 and 
                                                          
 84.  See, e.g., Naomi Zeveloff, Since Trump Won, All Israel Is Talking About Annexation.  
Why?, FORWARD (Feb. 11, 2017), http://forward.com/news/israel/362047/since-trump-won-all-is-
rael-is-talking-about-annexation-why/.  85.  See, e.g., Jonathan Lis, Israel Raises Electoral Threshold to 3.25 Percent, HAARETZ (Mar. 
12, 2014), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.579289.   86.  According to the law,  
70 Knesset members—10 of whom must be from the opposition—may file a complaint 
with the Knesset speaker against any lawmaker who supports armed struggle against Is-
rael or incites to racial hatred, kicking off the impeachment process.  The Knesset House 
Committee would then debate the complaint before clearing it with a three-quarter ma-
jority in the committee.  The motion to dismiss the lawmaker would then be sent to the 
plenum, where, if 90 of the 120 Knesset members vote in favor, the MK would be ousted.  
The deposed lawmaker could then appeal the decision with the Supreme Court. 
Marissa Newman & Times of Israel Staff, Knesset Approves Controversial Law to Remove Law-
makers from Office, TIMES OF ISR. (July 20, 2016), http://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-ap-
proves-bill-to-remove-lawmakers-from-office/; see also Amir Fuchs, Opinion, MK Suspension Bill: 
Anti-Democratic to the Core, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (June 6, 2016), https://en.idi.org.il/arti-
cles/2357.  A petition against this law is currently in proceedings before the HCJ.  See HCJ 
10214/16, MK Yousef Jabareen v. Knesset.   87.  Basic Law: The Knesset, amendment no. 46 of March 14, 2017, Hebrew version, 
https://www.nevo.co.il/law_word/law14/law-2618.pdf.    88.  Avirama Golan, The Boycott Law Is Unconstitutional and Undemocratic, HAARETZ (July 
12, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/the-boycott-law-is-unconstitutional-and-undemocratic-
1.372728.  89.  Roy Konfino & Mordechai Kremnitzer, Opinion, Implications of the ‘Nakba Law’ on Is-
raeli Democracy, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (June 22, 2009), https://en.idi.org.il/articles/10132.   90.  In its editorial board op-ed, the Washington Post described this legislation as “[a] danger 
to Israeli democracy.”  Editorial Board, A Danger to Israeli Democracy, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2016), 
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legislation permitting suburban communities to “filter” candidates who wish 
to join these communities by special selection committees, thereby strength-
ening the ability of these communities to officially exclude Arab citizens.91 
B.  Second-Order Instances of Anti-Constitutionalism 
Recent years also reveal what we term second-order instances of “anti-
constitutionalism.”  These are political, legal, and cultural changes—which 
take place in secondary spheres such as civil society, media and communica-
tion sectors, culture and education sectors, the  Israeli-Arab minority, and the 
public sphere—that contribute to constitutional retrogression.  Although 
these instances do not directly relate to the “Capital-C” Constitution, these 
social, political, and regulatory processes are noteworthy due to their aggre-
gate effect on the Israeli constitutional order and democracy.  Such effect is 
sometimes even more dramatic than formal legal and constitutional reforms 
described earlier in this Article. 
Among these changes is the social delegitimization of the Arab minority 
that was clearly expressed by the Prime Minister’s 2015 election day speech 
portraying the voting of the Israeli-Arab citizens as a danger.92  In the same 
vein is the administration’s assault on civil society organizations in pursuit 
of establishing their status almost as “enemies of the public,” and the admin-
istration’s declared intention to restrict civil society organizations’ ability to 
criticize governmental policy.93  At the same time and to influence public 
                                                          
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-danger-to-israeli-democracy/2016/01/02/22f90a2e-
af3d-11e5-b711-1998289ffcea_story.html?utm_term=.6f6742240137 (noting “Israel’s democracy 
has been a pillar of strength through years of siege.  It is not always easy to tolerate or defend groups 
that criticize the state or those in power, but allowing them to function normally is an important test 
of democracy, and, ultimately, the mark of an open and free society.”); see also Huq & Ginsburg, 
supra note 10, at 50 (noting that “even a democracy like Israel is now requiring disclosure of foreign 
funding.  Critics of the recent Israeli law argue that it is one sided, designed to restrict funding for 
pro-Palestinian NGOs but not for settlements in the Occupied Territories.  Even if not so designed, 
selective enforcement of such laws allows the state to shape the environment for public discourse” 
(footnotes omitted) (citing Peter Beaumont, Israel Passes Law to Force NGOs to Reveal Foreign 
Funding, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/israel-
passes-law-to-force-ngos-to-reveal-foreign-funding)).   91.  Seth J. Frantzman, Opinion, Ten Reasons Acceptance Committees Are Bad for Israel, 
JERUSALEM POST (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Ten-reasons-acceptance-com-
mittees-are-bad-for-Israel-376527.  92.  Ishaan Tharoor, On Israeli Election Day, Netanyahu Warns of Arabs Voting ‘in Droves’, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/17/on-israeli-election-day-netanyahu-warns-of-arabs-
voting-in-droves/?utm_term=.f57a15b28b82 (“The right-wing government is in danger. . . .  Arab 
voters are coming out in droves to the polls.  Left-wing organizations are busing them out” (quoting 
a Facebook video post by Netanyahu)).  93.  Sarfati & Rubin, supra note 13, at 6 (“[C]ivil society organizations have come under attack 
by consecutive right-wing governments and right-wing organizations.  In recent years the Israeli 
government has pursued a series of anti-NGO initiatives, including proposed bills that called for 
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discourse, the current government has strengthened its control over the me-
dia,94 and also conducted a nationwide campaign to prevent the establishment 
of the public broadcasting bureau.95  In addition, the Minister of Culture, Miri 
Regev, proposed cultural loyalty tests in which institutions can be denied 
funding if they harm the Israeli State or its symbols.96  Therefore, the gov-
ernment explicitly promotes a link between public funding and cultural loy-
alty to state values that are aimed at effectively silencing critical positions.97  
Also, one can add to the list of government practices aimed at centralized 
control in the education system, and a desire to hobble the public discourse 
in the field of democratic citizenship.98 
What leads Israeli democracy to such a retrogression?  There are multi-
ple reasons.  For example, a relatively large Israeli public (mainly the extreme 
religious groups) has no real commitment to a liberal democracy.99  Other 
                                                          
revoking certain organizations’ tax-exempt statuses, denying NGO registration on political grounds, 
requiring governmental preapproval for donations from foreign funders, and labeling certain NGOs 
funded by foreign money as ‘foreign agents.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Lihi Ben-Shitrit, The 
Israeli Government and Civil Society Organizations,  ALJAZEERA CTR. FOR STUD. (Feb, 17, 2016), 
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/02/201621791234701755.html)).  94.  Id. at 6–7 (“[T]he changing public discourse is influenced by the economically shaky sit-
uation of the media market in Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s practical control over the 
popular daily Israel Hayom which is owned by Netanyahu’s patron U.S. billionaire Sheldon Ad-
elson.”).  In Freedom House 2016’s “Freedom of the Press” report, Israel was downgraded to  
“Partly Free” status “due to the growing impact of Israel Hayom, whose owner-subsidized business 
model endangered the stability of other media outlets, and the unchecked expansion of paid con-
tent—some of it government funded—whose nature was not clearly identified to the public.”  
FREEDOM HOUSE, ISRAEL (2016), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/israel.  
Freedom House’s 2017 report stated that “[i]n 2016, Netanyahu used his Facebook page to excoriate 
two high-profile investigative journalists, prompting several top reporters to sign a petition object-
ing to his conduct.  He has also been accused of colluding with key media owners to shape favorable 
coverage.  While Israel has historically enjoyed a vibrant and pluralistic media sector, these and 
other problems have caused press freedom in the country to decline in recent years.”  FREEDOM 
HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2017: PRESS FREEDOM’S DARK HORIZON 9–10 (2017), 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2017.  95.  For example, the Culture and Sports Minister, Miri Regev, publicly questioned the point 
of establishing a new public broadcasting corporation if it would not be controlled by the govern-
ment.  See Barak Ravid, Miri Regev: Why Set Up New Broadcasting Corporation if We Don’t Con-
trol It?, HAARETZ (July 31, 2016), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.734527.  96.  Marissa Newman, Culture Minister Pushes Bill to Condition Funding on ‘Loyalty’, TIMES 
OF ISR. (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.timesofisrael.com/culture-minister-to-push-bill-to-hinge-fund-
ing-on-loyalty/.   97.  See Benjy Cannon, Opinion, 5 Frightening Attacks on Israel’s Democracy, JSTREET (Feb. 
1, 2016), http://jstreet.org/blog-5-frightening-attacks-on-israels-democracy_1/#.WdlTOGiCw2w.  98.  Akiva Eldar, Israel’s Education Minister Takes on Role of Political Censor, AL-MONITOR 
(Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/01/israel-naftali-bennett-educa-
tion-occupation-human-rights-idf.html (noting, “Israeli Education Minister Naftali Bennett is pro-
moting a law barring representatives of any anti-occupation organizations from entering high 
schools, effectively censoring students from information that contradicts the state’s narrative”).  99.  For example, according to the 2016 Israeli Democracy Index, almost sixty percent of the 
ultra-orthodox think that Jewish citizens should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens.  See 
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main reasons, according to Mordechai Kremnitzer, appear to include a con-
ceptual maneuver, which identifies critical voices in society with de-legiti-
mizing the state and the difficult public environment surrounding the Israeli-
Palestine conflict.100  The endless challenges of security threats coupled with 
the hopeless struggle are lethal to democracy, which requires optimistic 
winds of hope.101 The optimistic state of mind was severely harmed by the 
extreme right-wing success in creating an identification of the left wing with 
values such as democracy, liberalism, and human rights.102  It seems that Carl 
Schmitt’s overarching understanding of the political realm—“[t]he specific 
political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is 
that between friend and enemy”103—is, alas, the generative force behind Is-
raeli politics.  On one occasion the enemy is Iran, sometimes it is the media, 
and very often it is left-wing human rights organizations or the left wing in 
general.104  
A comparison of the Israeli situation to some of the more familiar recent 
comparative cases reveals, to our opinion, several troubling characteristics of 
populism, political centralization of powers, a continuing risk for the com-
petitiveness of the political system,105 and “executive aggrandizement.”106  
Not to be mistaken, the characteristics of the erosion of democratic institu-
tions in Israel are more moderate compared to other relevant places, and the 
Israeli case is far from more advanced cases of constitutional retrogression 
                                                          
TAMAR HERMANN ET AL., THE ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INDEX 2016 HIGHLIGHTS 16 (2016), 
https://en.idi.org.il/media/7839/democracy-index-2016-abs-eng.pdf.  In the 2012 Israeli Democ-
racy Index, over eighty percent of the ultra-Orthodox stated that the Jewish aspect is more important 
than the democratic aspect of the state.  See TAMAR HERMANN ET AL., THE ISRAELI DEMOCRACY 
INDEX 2012, at 31–32 (2012), https://en.idi.org.il/media/5645/index2012eng.pdf  (stating also that 
“among the ultra-Orthodox, the haredi-leumi, and the Orthodox, the clear preference was for the 
Jewish component”).   100.  For the interview of Professor Mordechai Kremnitzer, see Hagar Buchbut, Is There a Risk 
to Israeli Democracy?, YNETNEWS (May 31, 2016), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
4803112,00.html.  101.  Id.  102.  Id.   103.  CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26 (George Schwab trans., University 
of Chicago Press ed. 1996) (1932).  104.  Sarfati & Rubin, supra note 13, at 6 (“Philanthropic funds like the New Israel Fund and 
pro-peace organizations like Betselem and Shovrim Shtika are accused of being anti-Zionist and 
disloyal.  Right-wing organizations Im Tirzu and NGO Monitor supervise contents delivered in in-
stitutions of higher education and conduct shaming campaigns against scholars identified with leftist 
ideas.”).    105.  See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN 
THE ERA OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS (2015). 
 106.  Nancy Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 10–13 (2016). 
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recently investigated, such as in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Romania, Vene-
zuela, and South Africa.107  Israel is still a functioning democracy with strong 
judicial and democratic institutions.108  Nevertheless, the Israeli case is an 
incrementally ongoing constitutional crisis and not just a form of legitimate 
constitutional hardball.109  This constitutional retrogression is characterized 
                                                          
 107.  See, e.g., Miklós Bánkuti et al., Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution, 23 
J. DEMOCRACY 138, 138–40 (2012).  See generally CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL AREA: THEORY, LAW AND POLITICS IN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA (Armin von 
Bogdandy & Pál Sonnevend eds., 2015); ROBERTO GARGARELLA, LATIN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1810–2010 (2013).   108.  The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2016 Democracy Index report classifies each country 
as one of four types of regimes—full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime, or authoritarian 
regime—based on five factors: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; functioning of gov-
ernment; political participation; and political culture.  See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 
DEMOCRACY INDEX 2016: REVENGE OF THE “DEPLORABLES” 3, 6 (2017), http://felipesaha-
gun.es/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Democracy-Index-2016.pdf.  In the Democracy Index 2016, Is-
rael is characterized as a flawed democracy.  Id. at 7.  It is still ranked first in the Middle East and 
North Africa region.  Id. at 44.  The report notes, 
  The best performer in the region was Israel, climbing five places and rising to 29th 
place globally.  Israel has worked to strengthen various public institutions—such as the 
offices of the attorney general and the accountant general—to ensure that the government 
remains accountable to the public between elections.  However, the improvement in Is-
rael’s ranking masks a huge disparity between the rights enjoyed by its Jewish citizens 
and the rapidly growing Muslim-Arab population.  Overall, the higher score was not suf-
ficient to propel Israel into the ranks of the world’s “full democracies”.  
Id. at 44.   109.  Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004) (ex-
plaining that constitutional hardball “consists of political claims and practices—legislative and ex-
ecutive initiatives—that are without much question within the bounds of existing constitutional doc-
trine and practice but that are nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-constitutional 
understandings”).  For a scholarly analysis of the current state of affairs see the collected essays in 
the 2017 symposium held by I-CONnect on Constitutional Capture in Israel?.  Some approaches are 
consistent with our analysis.  See, e.g., Alon Harel, The Triumph of Israeli Populism, I-CONNECT 
(Aug. 22, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/08/the-triumph-of-israeli-populism (focusing 
on the role of Populism in the deterioration of Israel’s liberal democratic culture); Gila Stopler, 
Constitutional Capture in Israel, I-CONNECT (Aug. 21, 2017), http://www.icon-
nectblog.com/2017/08/constitutional-capture-israel (emphasizing the process of constitutional cap-
ture in the Israeli context).  Others see things in a different way, even if still somewhat disturbing.  
See Barak Medina, The Israeli Liberal Democracy: A Critical Assessment, I-CONNECT (Aug. 24, 
2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/08/the-israeli-liberal-democracy-a-critical-assessment 
(“I do not share the view that Israel has already slid into a process of ‘constitutional capture,’ similar 
to the trend against liberal democracy evident in countries like Turkey, and even E.U. members 
such as Hungary, Poland, and others.  But the risk does exist…”); Iddo Porat, Is There Constitutional 
Capture in Israel?, I-CONNECT (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/08/is-there-
constitutional-capture-in-israel (viewing these developments as a legitimate democratic response by 
the political Right to the dominance of the Left in several public spheres); Ruth Gavison, Some 
Concluding Comments: What Is the State of Democracy? How to Defend It?, I-CONNECT (Aug. 
26, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/08/some-concluding-comments-what-is-the-state-
of-democracy-how-to-defend-it (“Israel is not on the path to becoming a de-facto one party democ-
racy or even a one-bloc government.  Even if all the allegedly anti-democratic bills are passed 
(highly unlikely) – this in itself will not perpetuate the rule of one man or party or bloc.  Moreover, 
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inter alia by a strong ideological opposition to the 1992 constitutional revo-
lution and the liberal-universal values it represents: populist and separatist 
political rhetoric, continuous attempts to undermine the state’s liberal char-
acter, direct hostility to constitutional institutions identified with the Israeli 
constitution, and to civil society organizations associated with Palestinian’s 
rights.  The weakening of the political market starting in 2009 and the domi-
nance of the right-wing Netanyahu’s coalitions is leading to an erosion of the 
judicial and democratic institutions. 
In this brief Article, our goal is not to thoroughly analyze each of these 
changes but to flag the current changes in the Israeli political and constitu-
tional order in an idiosyncratic manner—still not fully corresponding with a 
complete backslide towards a non-liberal democracy, but in a perilous path 
that might end in such a model. 
III.  SO WHAT? DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
A.  Israel and the Global South 
Emerging scholarship emphasizes the activist role of courts in “fragile” 
and transformative democracies.110  Heavily focusing on courts in countries 
with fragile democracies in the Global South, such as Colombia, India, and 
South Africa, new research suggests that to improve the quality of deficient 
political systems, courts deviate from standard models of judicial review in 
an aim to preserve and strengthen democratic processes and institutions 
within difficult political environments.  American constitutionalism, these 
studies argue, cannot fully explain the activity of courts in emerging democ-
racies. 
Alongside some work that has already become fundamental,111 new 
comparative constitutional literature is blurring the difference between liberal 
constitutional models (primarily the United States, with its liberal focus on 
negative constitutional freedoms protection) and “southern” constitutional 
models, characterized by transformative and aspirational ambition to create 
social change through constitutional design and adjudication.  Among these 
southern components, Michaela Hailbronner mentions the commitment to 
fundamental state-driven change; participatory governance; material redistri-
bution; symbolic recognition; justiciable state duties or positive rights; and 
                                                          
present-day elections do require a measure of ‘populism’ in the sense of identifying what the ‘peo-
ple’ wants and needs and catering to it to some extent.  This is as it should be, and why it is important 
to point out and celebrate this core of democracy rather than condemn it outright as anti-demo-
cratic”).  110.  ISSACHAROFF, supra note 105, at 9.    111.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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horizontal application of constitutional rights in private disputes.112  Norma-
tively, this new scholarship presents a robust model of judicial review where 
democratic deliberation is defective or where weak democratic institutions 
are facing a dominant executive.  This literature has developed in recent years 
under the understanding that the constitutions of the Global South have 
evolved in light of the challenges faced by countries such as India, Colombia, 
and South Africa—primarily democratic instability and the need to establish 
a stable rule of law in renewed and transitional democracies, as well as the 
need to bring the challenge of inequality to the institutional element of con-
stitutional law. 
The mere existence of constitutional models which are different from 
those in North America or Britain is not new.  However, what is being re-
newed in recent times is the South-North dialogue,113 which refers to the 
scholarly insight, according to which models that were previously attributed 
only to the Global South countries could be relevant (as a positive analysis) 
and should be relevant (as a normative substance) even in well-established 
democracies, and that the models can help these democracies cope with cur-
rent challenges such as populism, inequality, multiculturalism and demo-
cratic instability.114 
This new understanding also works in the opposite direction.  Southern 
models of constitutional adjudication, which do not make a clear distinction 
between law and politics, are called to be inspired by the experience of more 
established democracies in maintaining this separation.  Thus, for example, 
Hailbronner, in her important study and provocative comparison between In-
dia and Germany, poses the question: “Is there a way forward that might be 
able to combine the advantages and avoid the downsides of both models, the 
collaborative Indian approach with its destructive consequences for legal au-
tonomy and the ‘legal’ German with its exclusionary hierarchical conception 
of judicial authority?”115 
We wish to join these scholars and to reconstruct Israel as a case of a 
transformative constitution that has been dealing with backlash in recent 
                                                          
 112.  Michaela Hailbronner, Transformative Constitutionalism: Not Only in the Global South, 
65(3) AM. J. COMP. L. 527 (2017), https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article-ab-
stract/doi/10.1093/ajcl/avx016/4158464/Transformative-Constitutionalism-Not-Only-in-the?redi-
rectedFrom=fulltext  113.  Michaela Hailbronner, Overcoming Obstacles to North-South Dialogue: Transformative 
Constitutionalism and the Fight Against Poverty and Institutional Failure, 49 VERFASSUNG UND 
RECHT IN ÜBERSEE VRÜ 253, 259 (2016) (noting, “differences between North and South are here 
a matter of degree rather than being categorical, and there remains plenty of room for mutual learn-
ing”).   
 114.  See, e.g., Hailbronner & Landau, supra note 14 (“The challenge of populism is thus ripe 
for Global South-Global North dialogue, perhaps indeed with the rich experiences of the Global 
South serving as a major source of ideas for the north.”).  115.   Hailbronner, supra note 112, at 48.  
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years.  To us, it seems that the Israeli case can benefit from this conversation, 
both on a positive and normative level.  According to us, the well-known 
reputation of the constitutionalization of the Basic Laws on Human Rights 
has influenced the perception of the Israeli constitutional project, in the eyes 
of many, as a western-liberal success story.  However, it seems that the suc-
cess story regarding the constitutional revolution is somewhat false.  As Ran 
Hirschl has already insisted, the Israeli project has made a great effort to be 
portrayed as a liberal one when, in fact, it has grown in a much more un-
liberal, religious, and sub-democratic climate.116  We mostly agree with this 
claim,117 and recent events support the challenge of the traditional under-
standing.  All this should lead to a new view of Israeli constitutionalism—
which is similar to what current research characterize as the Global South. 
We introduce a reconstructed reading of Israeli constitutional jurispru-
dence and constitutional culture, primarily as a democracy-facilitating en-
deavor and not as a western-liberal project of counter-majoritarian protection 
on liberal rights.  Our suggested new reading of the constitutional revolution 
is more of a transformative project that aims to strengthen democratic insti-
tutions, basic norms of government, and the rule of law, and to ensure delib-
erative decisionmaking processes and to consolidate democratic institutions, 
alongside the well-known human rights jurisprudence, that also was used to 
strengthen institutional and democratic facilitating interests.118 
Israel’s branding as a constitutional liberal success story was missing.119  
Current scholarly perception is evolving in a troubling gap.  While traditional 
scholarly perception of the constitutional revolution is a one of a liberal pro-
ject, in reality, it is much more reasonable to perceive it as a transformative  
one.  The surrender of the constitutional revolution designers (and of Israeli 
literature) to a liberal narrative of the constitutional revolution was a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  It led the Court itself and the academic arena to perceive 
Israeli constitutionalism as a liberal-Western project and, most particularly, 
allowed critics of the constitutional revolution to criticize it in terms of anti-
liberalism, localism, and revisionism.  While a functional examination of 
what the Court actually did in these decades might have produced a different 
                                                          
 116.  RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 60–61 (2014).  117.  Hirschl also argued that an important origin of the constitutionalization of the Basic Laws 
were the hegemonic and Ashkenazi elite aspiration to maintain its political power by transferring 
institutional power from the political arena to the court.  See HIRSCHL, supra note 31, at 50–51.  We 
have some reservations about the ethnical element of this argument.    118.  Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive 
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 1, 1–2 (2004).  119.  Recently, the image of the court has begun to erode in other areas as well.  See Adam 
Shinar, Idealism and Realism in Israeli Constitutional Law, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE 
OF LAW: BRIDGING IDEALISM AND REALISM 257, 279 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2017).   
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picture of a project similar in character to that of the Colombian Constitu-
tional Court or the Indian Supreme Court, our argument is that the Court was 
more transformative than the liberal image attributed.120 
B.  Israel’s Structural Constitution 
The second argument is that although the project was more transforma-
tive than it was characterized, it was not sufficiently satisfactory to fit Israel’s 
democratic challenges, as reflected in the recent retrogression. 
The constitutional revolution was a human rights revolution.  Its consti-
tutional tools are characterized by anti-majorities’ protection of individuals.  
Although the constitutional protection was spread over a narrow range of 
rights, the constitutional methodology leads us to look at each problem in 
terms of rights violations.  At the doctrinal level, the narrative of liberal con-
stitutionalism is a narrower lens through which the jurists in Israel see the 
world—the constitutional protection of human rights.  However, the Consti-
tution is also composed of an entire institutional sphere that protects the abil-
ity to defend human rights, and we believe is a relatively neglected aspect of 
Israeli constitutional theory. 
While the constitutional revolution led constitutional system designers, 
mainly judges and academics, to focus on constitutional anti-majoritarian ju-
dicial review and to develop a robust concept of human rights, it also led 
them to neglect (or at least to insufficiently develop) important institutional 
and participatory elements that could strengthen the democratic foundations 
and legitimacy of the constitutional revolution.  Over the past decades, the 
“liberal bias” of the constitutional venture has led the Supreme Court to be-
come progressive—perhaps one of the most progressive courts in the world 
in the field of counter-majoritarian constitutional review.  However, this 
characteristic was built on the Court’s activism and strong reputation, and it 
did not rely on stronger institutional foundations—a structural constitution, 
separation of powers, a development of the supervisory capacity of the par-
liament, or the strengthening of the constitutional ethos in the public 
sphere.121 
The problem is the current challenges do not relate exclusively to the 
protection of rights,122 but rather relate to the law of democracy—constitu-
tional identity, separation of powers, and social justice.  There is a need for a 
                                                          
 120.  We elaborate on this point in another, still in-process, project entitled “Israel and The 
Global South – Israel’s Transformative Constitutionalism.”  121.  Moshe Cohen-Eliya, Israeli Case of a Transformative Constitution (Mar. 3, 2012) (un-
published manuscript), https://works.bepress.com/moshe_cohen-eliya/1/.   122.  Even current challenges in balancing human rights are intensively tangled with the need to 
secure a democratic public sphere.  For example, a recent ruling of the HCJ enabled protesters to 
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new theoretical understanding of Israeli constitutionalism, as reflected in the 
past, by the fragile democracies’ literature that included Israel only as a case-
study for a militant democracy123 and not as a case-study of hyper-execu-
tiveism.124  Thus, prospectively, while thinking of ways to recalculate the 
constitutional track, institutional aspects of the Israeli constitution must be at 
the forefront.125 
We call for a new understanding of this challenge, considering what the 
Global South has to offer, and without any reservations about the implica-
tions of approaching such new boundaries, which we believe is inevitable.  
We call for democratic-facilitating judicial review, which includes the pro-
tection of democratic institutions—especially the Knesset and legal and bu-
reaucratic gatekeepers—and the use of “basic structure” doctrines in order to 
protect the basic principles of the constitutional order, if necessary.126  In that 
respect, the Global South experience can “help us see things at home in a 
different light, help challenge long-accepted truths and give us a sense of our 
own blind spots.”127 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Considering the evolution of the constitutional revolution after its first 
two decades, we acknowledge that the current dynamics it has created are the 
opposite of what it was trying to create.  What we are now experiencing is a 
counter-revolution.  Instead of strengthening the Israeli government’s com-
mitment to democracy in the long run, it led to an erosion of democracy and 
to question the legitimacy of the constitutional discourse, especially by new 
elites who are not committed to the original constitutional project and who 
                                                          
maintain the right to protest against the attorney general and Prime Minister Netanyahu.  See HCJ 
6536/17 Movement for Quality of Government v. Israel Police (Oct. 8, 2017) (Isr.).  
 123.  See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1447–50, 1457–
58 (2007).   124.  See GARGARELLA, supra note 76.  Gargarella describes and evaluates the longstanding 
political, legal, economic, and popular process of centralization of authority vs. expansion of rights 
in Latin-American constitutional history, and he examines the post 1990s new constitutions, which 
had a strong emphasis on rights reform but which have “left the traditional vertical organization of 
power almost untouched”  ROBERTO GARGARELLA, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF INEQUALITY: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE AMERICAS, 1776–1860, at 148–151 (2010).    125.  For a contemporary and thorough depiction of structural constitutionalism, see generally 
Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2016).  126.  On the basic structure doctrine, see generally SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: A STUDY OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE (2009); Yaniv Roz-
nai, The Migration of the Indian Basic Structure Doctrine, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA—A 
FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF JUSTICE V. R. KRISHNA IYER 240 (Malik Lokendra ed., 2012).  127.  Hailbronner, supra note 112, at 262.  
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have their own democratizing agenda.128  The result, these days, is a lack of 
commitment to the constitutional culture and a view of political presentation 
of rights arguments as disloyal.  There is a need for revisiting existing narra-
tives in relation to Israeli constitutionalism, considering the presented chang-
ing political landscape as reflected in the recent constitutional retrogression. 
Emerging scholarship emphasizes the activist role of courts in fragile 
and transformative democracies.129  Focusing strongly on courts in the dem-
ocratically fragile settings of the Global South, new research suggests courts 
deviate from standard models of counter-majoritarian review and aim to pre-
serve and strengthen democratic processes and institutions within difficult 
political environments, hence, improving the quality of deficient political 
systems.  We argue that current times make this body of literature to be much 
more relevant to the Israeli political climate.  The Israeli case, in other words, 
is slightly removed from the “liberal North” and closer to the Global South. 
Such a rereading not only allows a better perception of the changing 
landscape of Israeli constitutionalism, but provides better tools to face in-
stances of constitutional retrogression.  The current declining democratic 
shift calls for changing the balance toward protection of the basic Israeli con-
stitutional structure.  Judicial review and scholarly writings alike should fo-
cus on facilitating democracy and protecting democratic institutions. 
                                                          
 128.  Various sections of the Israeli public hold a very thin understanding of democracy which 
is purely procedural or majoritarian.  In a recent speech at judicial swearing-in ceremony, Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Miriam Naor addressed such understanding by stating, “Democracy cannot be 
identified by the rule of the majority.  Not every decision or law passed by a majority is inherently 
democratic.  History teaches us that when there is no restraining factor on the majority it can turn 
into a tyranny.”  See Yoel Domb, Not Every Law Passed by Majority Is Democratic, ARUTZ SHEVA 
(April 26, 2017), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/228656.  129.  See supra notes 109–110.   
